1. Wake up later than I intend to
2. Miss RJ
3. ____ ____ _______ ____ __ _______ ___ __ __
4. Feel academically motivated by my schoolmates
5. Complain about Aramark (a company supplying food to state prisons and which also happens to supply food for my school)
6. Discuss math or physics problems
7. Procrastinate
8. Feel that I am limiting my own potential
9. Feel intellectually stimulated and challenged
10. Did I mention, miss RJ?

1. Wake up later than I intend to
From 25 hours of instruction per week to the current 15, and saving about 10 hours per week on transport, it’s a wonder why it feels like I have less time than I had in RJ. And then I realise how those hours in the morning spent travelling to school and attending flag raising and lessons back in JC have now been converted into, well, sleep. Tues and Fri, my only lesson, Japanese, starts at 11 am, and _ ______ ____ __ ____ ____ 15 _______ ______ ____. That’s 7 fewer hours of productive time a week gone D: no matter how many alarms I set for myself on my phone, I’ll end up cancelling them when they ring, on good days one by one, on bad days all at once, once the first one rings. No matter what, I never seem to wake up as early as I intend to, and always wonder how much more college life would have been nicer, if only I could get up.

2. Miss RJ
Those who have graduated – who doesn’t miss RJ?
Those who are still in RJ – you’ll realise eventually heh
But everyone misses RJ differently so I’ll devote a post to it soon

3. ____ ____ _______ ____ __ _______ ___ __ __
_____ ______ ______ ____ _’_ __ _______ ____ ________ __ _______. ________ ___ ___ _______ _________ ___ __________, ___ __ __ ___ ____ ___ _______ ____ __ ____ __ __________, __________ __ ____ ________, ____ ___ ______ ____ __ __________. ____, ________ ___ _______ ____ __ __________ ____ ___, __ _ ______ ____ ______ __ ______ ____ _____ ____, ___ ____ _____ ___ _ __, _____? _________ _’_ ____ _______ _______ ______ ____ _________.

___ _______ ____ ___ ____ _________. ____ __ ____ ________ _____________ _______, ___ ____ __ __ ____ ________ ___ ____ _____ __ ______ _____________ _______, ___ __________ ___’_ __ ______ ____ _ _____ ____ ____ __ __ ___.

_ ____ ________ ____ _____ ________ _____ ___ – __ __________ __ ___ ____, ___ _______ ____ ___ ______ ____ _____ _____ _______ ___ ___, ___ ___ _______ __ _____ _____ _____ ____ ________ ________ ___ ___’_ ____ ____ _____ (_____ __ ____ _____ ____ __ -.-), _____ ____ __ __ (?) ___ ______ _ _______ (____’_ _______ _______). ____ ____ _______ ____ ___ _______ __ _______ _’_ ____ _______ __ _____ ____ ___ _____, _________, __? _ ____ ____ ___ ___, ___ ____ ____ ____ __ _____.

_’_ ______ ____ _____ ______ ________ _____ ___ _________ _____ __________ ___ ___, ___ _ ___ __ ______, __ ________ ___ _________ __________, (_) ____ __ _____ ________ ______ _____ ________ _______ ________ __ _____ __ ____, ___ (_) ____ __ _________ __ ____ ___ ____________ ____ ______ ___ _______ ________ __ _______ ________, ___ _ ______ __ ___ _______ ______ ____ ____ _______ __ _____ __________ __________. __’_ ____ _______ __ ____ ________, ___ ___ _____ ___, ____ ______ ______ __ _______ ________. __ _______ _____ _ _____ ____ ________ ______ ____ ____________ ______ __ _______ __ ________, __ _____ ______ _____ __________ ____ __ _____ ______ _____, ___ ________ __ _______ ________ __ _______ _____ __________.

___ __ ___ _____ ____, _ ____ ____ ________ __ ________ __ ___ _______ ________, ___ __ _____ ____. __ _ _______ ___ _____ _____ _________ __ ______ __ ____ ____ ____, _ ____ ________ ________ _’_ __________ __ ___ _______ __ ________. __’_ ___ ____ _’_ ______ __ ______ __ _______ _____, __’_ ____ ___ _______ ________ ___ ____ _____ ___ ____ _____ __ ______ __ __ _____. __ ___ ____ __ _ _______ ________ _________, __ _____ __ __ ______, ___’__ ____ ____ ____________ ______ _______ ___’_ ___ ____, ___ ____ _____ _____________ ______ ____ ____. _’_ ___ _______ _____ ________, __ _____ _ ____ ____ 1 ____ ___ ____ ______ ___ __ _______, ___ __________ ____ 35 ______ ____. __’_ ____ ____ _ ____ __ ___ ___ ____ __ ____ _______ ________ _____ ____ _____ _____ ___ _________ _____, _______ _____ ___ ____ ___ ______, ______ ____ _____, ____ ____ _____ ________ _____ ___ _______ ____ ___ ______ ___ __ __, ____ _ ____ ____ ___ _____ __ _ _____. __’_ ___ ____ __ __ ____ _____ ____ __________ _____ ________–___ _______ ____ _____ ___ _______ ________, ___ __’_ ______ ______ __ _____ ___ _______ ____ _ ______ __ ______. _________ ____ __ ____ _ ___ __ _______ _______ ___ _________, __ _____ ____ _________ __ ___ _________ ______ _______ __ _ ___. ___ __ ___ _____ ____, _’_ ________ ___ ___ ________ _______ ______ __ ___________. ___ _ ____ ____ ____ __ ____ _ _____ _____ ___ __ ____ _______ _______ ________. Perhaps more than ever since I have stopped formally learning Chinese, and especially seeing that many Chinese Americans struggle with Chinese, I feel glad to have received good Chinese education in Singapore.

The problem of infinite regress threatens to show that none of our beliefs are justified and that none of them qualify as knowledge. The two leading theories that have been proposed to solve this problem, foundationalism and coherentism, each face considerable challenges in explaining how knowledge comes about within the respective frameworks. Amidst the debate of the validity of either theories, Professor Peter Klein has emerged to defend an unpopular position known as infinitism, the view that it is acceptable for knowledge to have a chain of justification that is “infinite and non-repeating” (Klein). If Klein is right, the regress problem would cease to be a problem, and our knowledge would prove to be secure despite there having no end to our justifications. In my essay, I will outline and evaluate Klein’s justifications for his theory, and, by raising further objections to infinitism, show how his theory unfortunately faces problems as well. Ultimately, I aim to show that infinitism, as it stands, is not a tenable solution to the regress problem.

Why should we believe Klein that knowledge claims can have a chain of justification extending infinitely, without there being a set of ultimate, foundational reasons? Klein offers two principles of good reasoning that, he claims, when taken together, entails that infinitism is right.

His first principle, Principle of Avoiding Circularity (PAC), states that

for all x, if a person, S, has a justification for x, then for all y, if y is in the evidential ancestry¹ of x for S, then x is not in the evidential ancestry of y for S. (Klein)

Here, Klein is formalising a principle that prohibits circular reasoning. For example, I would not be able to prove validly that I am the tallest student in class by saying that everyone else in class is shorter than me, when the proof for this is that I am the tallest student in class. By prohibiting the conclusion to be presupposed by the premises, Klein is obviously justified in formulating this principle of good reasoning.

His second principle, Principle of Avoiding Arbitrariness (PAA), states that

for all x, if a person, S, has a justification for x, then there is some reason, r₁, available to S for x, and there is some reason, r₂, available to S for r₁; etc. (Klein)

Here, Klein is formalising a principle that requires that for a person to have a justification for a claim, a reason must be available to him to support that claim, and another reason must be available to him to support that reason, and so on. If this principle is right, there should not be any reasons in this chain for which justification is not needed. This seems like a sound principle, for if we accept that justification is not needed for a reason in this chain, it seems that we can be arbitrary in our reasoning, and prove any contingent proposition to be true. For example, we can “prove” that all bachelors are blond by saying that all bachelors are left-handed and all left-handed men are blond, and accept the latter proposition without a reason, in violation of PAA.

Klein then moves on to claim, “the combination of PAC and PAA entails that the evidential ancestry of a justified belief be infinite and non-repeating. Thus, someone wishing to avoid infinitism must reject either PAC or PAA (or both)”. This seems to follow from his argument: save for the sceptical conclusion that no one ever has any justification in believing anything, PAA necessitates that the chain of justification be infinite or finite but circular. However, PAC eliminates the latter option, leaving the only option of an infinite and non-repeating chain of justification, that is, infinitism.

In sum, this is how Klein argued for why we necessarily ought to embrace infinitism. However, two major objections threaten the tenability of infinitism.

Firstly, it appears that through infinitism, any contingent proposition can be proven. For us to see why, Audi suggests we

take the obviously false proposition that I weigh at least 500 pounds. I could back up a belief of this by claiming that if I weigh at least 500.1 pounds, then I weigh at least 500 (which is self-evident), and that I weigh at least 500.1 pounds. I could “defend” this by appeal to the propositions that I weigh at least 500.2 pounds, and that if I do, then I weigh at least 500.1. And so forth… (189–190) [emphasis by the author]

Since this chain is infinite, every claim can be “defended” by further claims in the same fashion, and nothing in this argument is unsound. However, if infinitism turns out to accept any contingent proposition as justified, then surely we cannot consider it as a tenable structure of justification.

Klein defends infinitism by claiming that setting up the structure for a claim as above is a necessary condition to establish justification, but not a sufficient condition. For there truly to be a justification for a claim, the reasons for the claim must also be objectively and subjectively available to the subject. Thus, Klein would say that the proposition that I weigh at least 500.1 pounds is not available to the subject, and thus cannot serve as a reason that I weigh at least 500 pounds. However, while subjective availability is defined as “properly hooked up with S’s own beliefs” (Klein), Klein gives seven different definitions for objective availability, each containing vague terms like “sufficiently high probability”, “deepest epistemic commitments” and “intellectually virtuous person”. Ultimately, what Klein means by “availability” is extremely unclear, and hence his arguments do not defend infinitism effectively. In other words, the argument that any contingent claim can be defended using the framework provided by infinitism still stands.

The second major objection concerns the validity of PAA when applied to certain propositions. Klein challenges foundationalists to examine the set of propositions that they consider basic and self-justifying, and raises the question, “What makes these propositions truth-conducive?” That is, why are these propositions likely to lead to the truth? Klein claims that, for this question, either there is an answer or there is no answer. If there is an answer, then the answer would serve as a reason to justify the supposedly foundational belief, and thus the infinite regress continues. If there is no answer, then Klein claims that the proposition conflicts with PAA and is arbitrary, and that it is not a good argument. However, consider the proposition P₁ “If some dogs are pets, some pets are dogs” (189), which Audi suggested that no further reason explains. When hard pressed, we may suggest that the proposition P₂ that this follows from our logic system to be the reason which makes P₁ truth-conducive. However, beyond this, it is hard to see how P₂’s truth-conduciveness can be established via reason. Klein would claim that since there is no reason for our belief that P₂ is truth-conducive, we are being arbitrary. However, very few are willing to accept our logic system’s truth-conduciveness to be arbitrary. Hence, here, we have a case of a proposition without a further reason r, which we agree to be able to function as a reason for other propositions rationally. In other words, we have found what seems to be a counterexample to PAA. Since, by Klein’s own admission, infinitism requires both PAC and PAA to become a necessary option, counterexamples to PAA seriously threaten infinitism’s viability as a structure of justification.

As long as Klein is able to produce a clearer account of objective availability (to address the first objection) and defend PAA in light of any counterexamples (to address the second objection), there is still hope for infinitism. However, before these matters are resolved, infinitism does not seem to me to be a tenable solution to the regress problem, or a functioning theory of justification.

1305 words

Works Cited

Audi, Robert. Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. 2nd. New York: Routledge, 2003.

Klein, Peter D. “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.” Philosophy and Religion Department, Montclair State University. Jan 1998. Rutgers University. 16 Oct 2007 <http://chss2.montclair.edu/prdept/HK.htm>.

Endnotes

¹ For Klein, if r₃ is a reason for r₂ and r₂ is a reason for r₁, then r₃ and r₂ are both in the evidential ancestry of r₁.